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Ukraine’s free­dom must be defen­ded

Demo­cracy makes rulers account­able to the ruled. The pro­cess through which it achieves this his­tor­ic­ally rare mir­acle is elec­tions. These are imper­fect instru­ments, since no per­fect elect­oral sys­tem exists. Moreover, voters are, at best, ration­ally ignor­ant and, at worst, swayed by dan­ger­ous emo­tions. Nev­er­the­less, even imper­fect elect­oral sys­tems may achieve something his­tor­ic­ally rare: a peace­ful trans­fer of power, other than by inher­it­ance. We have now seen that in Hun­gary, with the defeat of Viktor Orbán last April, in Ser­bia, with the defeat of Aleksandar Vučić in Octo­ber, and most recently in the case of the US, with the defeat of the Repub­lic­ans in the midterm con­gres­sional elec­tions.

What is inter­est­ing about all three res­ults is that they occurred des­pite vary­ing attempts by incum­bents to rig the elect­oral sys­tem and the media in their favour. If the people are suf­fi­ciently angry and the mar­gin of vic­tory for the polit­ical oppos­i­tion big enough, even highly manip­u­lat­ive lead­ers can be swept aside. Need­less to say, this does not always work. If the sys­tem is suf­fi­ciently rigged in favour of the tyr­ant, elec­tions can become mean­ing­less in vir­tu­ally all cir­cum­stances. Vladi­mir Putin’s Rus­sia is a per­fect example. But what we have learnt is that, short of this, the people’s votes still mat­ter.

The dif­fer­ence between a full auto­cracy, in which only inca­pa­city, an elite coup, or viol­ence is likely to over­throw the ruler, and even an illiberal demo­cracy turns out to mat­ter enorm­ously. This in turn changes the nature of the state itself. In an auto­cracy, sooner or later one will see the abso­lute cor­rup­tion of abso­lute power — a cor­rup­tion that is as much of know­ledge as of motive. In a full auto­cracy, pleas­ing the tyr­ant comes to be the dom­in­ant motiv­a­tion. This cor­rodes everything. It is why, in the long run, for all their faults, demo­cratic soci­et­ies are not just more enjoy­able to inhabit but also far more effi­cient than any tyranny. Demo­cracy guards against the fol­lies of des­pots by mak­ing them account­able. This is, of course, why the lat­ter rig elec­tions.

If we look at the world of today, the place where the con­flict between des­pot­ism and demo­cracy is being waged most des­per­ately is Ukraine. Rus­sia’s tyr­ant, Putin, believes that Ukraine belongs to Rus­sia because of its his­tory. But the fact that a people and a ter­rit­ory were, in the past, part of an empire does not render the pos­ses­sion just. He also asserts that Ukraine is not a real coun­try. Ukrain­i­ans have refuted that claim decis­ively since Rus­sia’s inva­sion on Feb­ru­ary 24 2022. By fight­ing so effect­ively, they have proved that Ukraine is indeed a real coun­try. Remem­ber, too, that in Bud­apest in Decem­ber 1994, Ukraine gave up its nuc­lear arsenal in return for secur­ity guar­an­tees from the US, the UK, France, China and Rus­sia.

So, Putin is also repu­di­at­ing his own coun­try’s word.

Fur­ther­more, Ukrain­i­ans will con­tinue to fight, because Rus­sia threatens to dis­mem­ber their coun­try. As the stra­tegic expert Lawrence Freed­man argued in “Ukraine: With or Without Trump” on his Substack last month: “Trump con­tin­ued to imply that the main obstacle [to a cease­fire] was Zelenskyy’s intransigence, as if he had a stake in a con­tinu­ing war. All this was the oppos­ite of the truth. Zelenskyy’s pos­i­tion on a cease­fire is far more aligned with Trump’s pro­pos­als than Putin’s.” Unfor­tu­nately, as recent events have shown, Don­ald Trump’s treach­ery mat­ters. US resources remain essen­tial for Ukraine, not­ably the pro­vi­sion of intel­li­gence. Fur­ther­more, Wash­ing­ton is also the prin­cipal inter­locutor between Ukraine and Rus­sia.

Ukrain­i­ans con­tinue to show determ­in­a­tion. As Freed­man notes, “the latest KIIS poll, pub­lished on 19 Octo­ber, showed that around 64% of respond­ents blamed Rus­sia for stalling peace nego­ti­ations and rejec­ted the idea that Ukraine’s gov­ern­ment should be more will­ing to com­prom­ise. Around 62% of Ukrain­i­ans are pre­pared to endure the war for as long as neces­sary. This includes the res­id­ents of Kyiv.” But they need much sup­port. (See charts.)

So, what is to be done? Rachel Reeves, former Brit­ish chan­cel­lor of the exchequer, Annegret Kramp-Kar­ren­bauer, former Ger­man min­is­ter for defence, Nath­alie Loiseau, former French min­is­ter for Europe, and Chrys­tia Free­land, former Cana­dian deputy prime min­is­ter, have argued recently in The Times that “Ukraine faces a des­per­ate winter as Rus­sia pum­mels its almost defence­less people from the air. It also faces a €70bn fin­an­cial hole next year. Without new fund­ing, Kyiv’s capa­city to sus­tain its defence will be gravely impaired. This will under­mine Europe’s secur­ity because Ukraine is our first line of defence against Rus­sian aggres­sion.” The answer, they write, is “for the EU to take cus­tody of the €210bn of sov­er­eign Rus­sian assets it immob­il­ised in 2022 so it can use them to help Kyiv in its defence”. Moreover, these “assets are large enough to provide a fund­ing bridge for Ukraine into 2029”.

This is mor­ally and prac­tic­ally a wise course. Might it still be pos­sible to per­suade Trump to give Ukraine the help the US alone can provide to enable this belea­guered coun­try to escape the Carthaginian peace Putin seeks? Might the Demo­crats use their new lever­age, espe­cially over fiscal policy, to help ensure this out­come? I have no idea. But Europeans have to recog­nise what is at stake. To his credit, Friedrich Merz, Ger­many’s chan­cel­lor, has shown, in the EU budget debate, that he under­stands the need. The oth­ers have to fol­low him. Europe has to rise to this occa­sion or risk dis­in­teg­ra­tion. If it fails, it might be picked to pieces by the world’s great powers. Europeans must act to save Ukraine from Putin’s tyranny, instead.

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