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In my favourite spoof ad, deepfakes of Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos and Sam Altman explain what’s happened to all the people whose jobs they’ve destroyed. Ranks of laid-off humans are shown sweating on cycles in the gym, powering AI data centres. A dystopia? Yes. But one that is starting to feel horribly possible.
Peddling Pelotons at the behest of broligarchs wasn’t quite what the Thatcherite politician Norman Tebbit had in mind when in 1981 he described how his unemployed father “got on his bike and looked for work”. But 45 years on, families across the globe fear AI may kill jobs, jeopardising our children’s futures. Entry-level jobs are already in decline. Kids are sending out hundreds of applications into the faceless algorithmic void. At least three-quarters of adults in Japan, France, Italy and Canada told Pew Research in 2022 they expected children to be worse off financially than their parents, as did majorities in the UK and US.
Being written off no longer feels like a problem just for someone else’s children. So when former Labour cabinet minister Alan Milburn unveiled his report this week on the almost 1mn UK under-25s who are “Neet” — not in employment, education or training — it resonated. This isn’t about “snowflake” dropouts: 15 per cent of Neets have a degree or equivalent and nearly 30 per cent got five good GCSEs or the equivalent at school. Almost three quarters of the Neets surveyed told the review they wanted to move into employment, education or training.
Among a litany of recommendations, the report’s overarching conclusions are brutally clear: welfare is trapping people in poverty, government has made hiring more costly and any solution must involve carrots as well as sticks. Advisers in the proposed new Youth Opportunity Service, for example, will create a plan for each Neet, and a persistent refusal to engage without good cause will lead to the loss of benefits. This is modelled on the Netherlands, where only one in 20 young people are Neet compared to one in eight in the UK, and where youth workers go out and knock on doors if a young person starts to drift. It also has echoes of what the coalition government did with work coaches.
Milburn has done the country a service by making clear that part of the answer must be making it “easier, cheaper and less risky” for companies to hire youngsters. It is maddening but telling that he can’t go further in exposing the role of Sir Keir Starmer’s government in having worsened the problem with new employment rights, higher minimum wages and higher employer national insurance contributions. He proposes to ease national insurance costs for 21- to 24-year-olds in retail and hospitality, and to slow further increases in the minimum wage. But Treasury officials are already resisting his NICs proposal, which they claim is hugely expensive and untargeted. The fact that no serious savings are projected for up to 10 years is a big stumbling block. But long-term economic inactivity is enormously costly to society in myriad ways.
This is, nevertheless, a potential watershed moment. An important but generally overlooked element in the review is a proposed “youth opportunity test” to ensure tax, spending and other policy decisions consider the impact on younger generations. While Whitehall can ignore or game such assessments, such a test might, for example, have raised serious questions about the impact of Angela Rayner’s employment rights package.
Not all of this is new. As long ago as 1981, James Callaghan warned of a “lost generation”. In the past 25 years, the Neet rate has rarely dropped below 10 per cent. But the increase in mental distress among young people, the ubiquity of screens and the erosion of the Saturday job have made the problem even stickier. Heartbreaking interviews conducted by the review reveal a consistent pattern: that too much of the system relies on an adult going out of their way to advocate for a young person: a teacher stays involved, a parent makes another call, a youth worker refuses to give up.
Milburn has thrown down a gauntlet to his party. He has also gifted it an argument: one it didn’t have when Starmer tried and failed to make limited welfare cuts. There must be something better than a malfunctioning welfare system and a health service that over-medicalises poor mental health. Dignity and a sense of purpose depend on work, and work must beat welfare.
What happens next is entirely in the hands of the prime minister. Andy Burnham is at the peak of his powers, with Labour MPs cock-a-hoop. The Milburn review can give the impression of momentum for a leader who is considering pushing back the spending review until late next year. It also presents a moral project that fits the prime minister’s interest in breaking down Whitehall silos. Everything points in the direction of a spending review that will redirect money to cross-cutting priorities, instead of the usual process of individual departmental bids. An awful lot is being envisaged at once: a rewiring of the civil service, devolution of powers both to local councils and to as yet largely unproven mayors and strategic authorities.
The missing piece for this government continues to be the lack of a credible plan for growth. It’s absurd that a party that has made it harder and riskier to hire people is proposing to spend even more money paying businesses to hire or create apprenticeships for the young. But while we wait for that penny to drop, Milburn has many good answers for avoiding a lost generation.
The writer is an FT contributing editor and former chief economist at the Bank of England
The declared ambition of the UK government is “good growth in every postcode”. While a compelling soundbite, the opinion among mainstream commentators and economists is that, like “hope in every heart”, it is just as unattainable — another example of rhetoric running way ahead of reality.
The desire for “good” growth comes at a time when the Office for Budget Responsibility is projecting stasis in household living standards for the remainder of this parliament and only a 1 per cent rise over the entire decade. In this environment, beggars cannot be choosers. We should probably welcome any growth, good, bad or ugly.
As for seeking it in every postcode, most economists would view that as potentially counter-productive. There are strong economies of scale at the city level. This suggests concentrating policy efforts on unlocking the potential of the UK’s second cities, which historically have underperformed their international counterparts.
Yet this is one of those rare occasions when politicians’ instincts should trump expert judgment when it comes to the art of the possible. In practice, there is a natural link between the “good” element of growth and its achievement “in every postcode”. This makes this objective not only ambitious but also realistic.
Research has taught us a great deal about what determines a “good life”. People’s income — economic growth, conventionally defined — plays a key role in shaping life satisfaction. Although the importance of income diminishes at higher levels of wealth, both among individuals and nation states, money still matters.
But the same research shows that money isn’t all that matters. As evidence, take the map of UK happiness. One of the most miserable places in the UK is also by far the richest: London. And the happiest place in a variety of surveys —Northern Ireland — is also one of the poorest. How do we explain this?
Life satisfaction is shaped to a significant extent by non-wage factors, both financial (the cost of housing and commuting) and non-financial (community, health, green spaces, security of housing and safe and vibrant high streets). With its high cost of commuting and housing, and low access to community and countryside, it is easy to see why London life, for some, sucks.
Recent research by PwC has put these financial and non-financial factors into a common currency and aggregated them into a “Public Value Score” for the UK on a hyper-local basis. This gives, for every UK postcode, an objective measure of the lived experience, or “good growth”, of its residents.
One of the striking findings is that, on average across the UK, non-financial factors matter around as much as financial factors for life satisfaction. Indeed, in some poorer and more rural areas, non-financial factors play a larger role in shaping lived experience, whereas in richer cities the opposite is true.
These differences, both in public value scores and their composition, are as great within regions as between them. In northern England, Trafford (with an upper-quartile public value score) sits cheek-by-jowl with (lower-quartile) Rochdale, while Windsor and Slough show the same pattern in the South. This highly variegated map means good growth, to be effective, does need to be achieved on a postcode-by-postcode basis.
The analysis also tells us that, even if high productivity and income are largely confined to cities, this does not preclude good growth everywhere. In more rural places, it simply means making compensating investments in the social amenities people value equally or more highly — from health and high streets to community and countryside, as Northern Ireland demonstrates.
This model of poly-, rather than city-centric, growth is set to become even more important looking ahead. While early English devolution deals focused on city-regions such as Greater Manchester, future deals will involve more dispersed and rural regions — places where the non-financial parts of good growth matter most.
In the recent Budget, the government extended “Good Growth Funds” — pioneered in Greater Manchester — to a wider range of devolved administrations. These collect together capital, public and private, for local investment. Tailored to the needs of the public in their postcode, social as well as financial, these funds have the potential to help meet the government’s objective.
Good growth in every postcode is both political rhetoric and practical possibility. A wider-angle lens on growth holds the key to its achievement. The benefits would not only be economic and social but political too: it is a good life, rather than just a good income, that seems to matter at the ballot box too. That should put hope in the heart of at least every Labour MP.
The AI fever in markets is breaking.
US stocks are on track for one of their worst years in two decades and suddenly the whole topic is on big investors’ lists of “things to worry about” for 2027 rather than a reason to be endlessly cheerful.
It is hard to say what exactly has spoilt the mood, but you can trace it back from the memory chip crash out in Asian markets over the summer. Since then, a wide range of important groups of stakeholders have said “no”. Corporate bond investors are sick of being force-fed often questionable tech debt. The general public in the US is sick of supersized data centres in their neighbourhoods. Fund managers are sick of, let’s say, flaky corporate governance standards at Nvidia, which would matter less were it not for the fact that in October, this company hit a peak market capitalisation of about $5.7tn — more than twice the size of the entire FTSE 100 index in the UK.
And now this week’s spectacular stock market listing of AI lab Anthropic feels less like a moment of triumph (aside from the chosen few now counting their billions) and more like a last hurrah. Fizzy market debuts are a classic sign of a cyclical top in markets, and a $1.5tn market capitalisation at listing certainly fits the fizzy description. It is time to move into a new gear.
“The market has been obsessed by the core AI topic and in 2027, the focus will shift,” said Vincent Mortier, chief investment officer at Amundi in Paris. “Monetisation will be difficult. It will be harder to justify higher levels of valuations. We are a little bit cautious and we prefer companies that are using AI — in robotics, in pharma, and some very boring industrial companies.”
The many AI slip-ups of 2026 have already delivered some of the worst days in the US stock market of the entire year — including a 2 per cent drop in the index on Anthropic’s first day — and now the S&P 500 benchmark index is up a measly 5 per cent in 2026. Without a serious pick-up in the next few weeks, this will be one of the worst years for the index in 20 — only six years have churned out poorer performances, and some of those were in periods of outright crisis.
All of this feels weirdly unfamiliar. One of the defining characteristics of the US stock market since the pandemic has been its extraordinary resilience. Come what may — war, tariffs, more war, you name it — the market has mostly ground higher. But again, the bombastic AI trade goes a long way to explaining that, and not just because tech stocks drive the bus for the overall market.
A lot of it has to do with the technodollar — the newfangled high-tech version of the petrodollar. Think back to the old-economy version of this, where oil is priced in dollars and the proceeds of its sale flood exporting nations, especially in the Middle East. These states churned those proceeds into US government bonds, in part because it’s the biggest, baddest bond market and nothing else is deep and liquid enough to accommodate those billions. The same is true of the chips trade, but this time in Asia.
Chip exporters such as South Korea and Taiwan have been flooded with money from US hyperscalers constructing vast data centres. Deutsche Bank noted this week that Korean semiconductor exports have jumped 200 per cent this year. Its trade surplus just in chips stands at almost $250bn. Indeed, for the first time ever, wrote Mallika Sachdeva at the bank, the global trade in chips had exceeded global trade in oil and gas.
But this time, she said, the riches were being churned not into bonds but into US stocks. This is likely for the same reason that the petrodollar pushed into bonds — the US makes up 64 per cent of the global stock market, based on weights in the MSCI all-country world index. Nothing else is big and liquid enough to accommodate the billions.
So the enormous AI infrastructure build-out — which UBS reckons accounts for more than half of global trade growth and all of US investment growth — pumps money into US stocks, which pump money into AI expansion, which pumps money into US stocks. On and on it goes, until the music stops.
“There is an element of circularity to be conscious of,” wrote Sachdeva at Deutsche Bank. “This could introduce instability in global flows should demand be reassessed.”
Well, analysts are wondering whether that reassessment is indeed coming, not necessarily immediately but in the next year or so. In a presentation this week, Jan Hatzius, chief economist at Goldman Sachs, said he was “optimistic on the economic pay-off to AI”, but that he did see “potential downside risk”.
“Some of it is related to the fact that we are building a large capital stock and that large capital stock . . . eventually it’s going to be built out, and then investment stops growing and may start to come down,” he said. “We don’t expect that to happen in 2027 . . . But that is, of course, subject to questions.”
You don’t have to be an AI doomster to see the cracks forming here. But all really exciting disruptive technology goes through phases of innovation, then whizz-bang expansion, then excess, then a sober sorting into winners and losers, and commoditisation. For investors, the magic is wearing off.
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