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Eco­nomic risks of the AI boom

Arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence has many — mostly far from fully under­stood — implic­a­tions for human­ity. Among these is something con­crete and cur­rent: it has launched a huge surge in spend­ing on phys­ical cap­ital, to meet the demand for huge data centres. Indeed, accord­ing to a fas­cin­at­ing paper, “Fin­an­cing the AI Buil­dout” by Stijn van Nieuwer­burgh of the Columbia Busi­ness School, spend­ing in the US will aver­age 3.6 per cent of GDP from 2025 to 2032 (inclus­ive). This would be lar­ger than the aver­age of 2.2 per cent of GDP spent on rail­ways between 1870 and 1890, let alone the 1.1 per cent spent on high­ways from 1956 to 1973. In fact, it would be the biggest sec­tor-spe­cific invest­ment boom of all.

Some of those earlier trans­form­a­tions were sus­tained over far longer peri­ods. But this fact makes the AI build-out even more con­cen­trated and so, quite pos­sibly, even more dis­rupt­ive. Moreover, as van Nieuwer­burgh explains, fin­an­cing the boom is now cre­at­ing some clas­sic risks, des­pite the strength of the huge com­pan­ies (mainly Alpha­bet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle) driv­ing the huge surge in spend­ing.

Moreover, these risks are also mac­roe­co­nomic. Booms can eas­ily turn into busts, as stock mar­ket valu­ations col­lapse, com­pan­ies go bank­rupt, lenders lose money and planned invest­ment van­ishes. Will this time be dif­fer­ent? Ulti­mately, that depends on the prof­it­ab­il­ity of the new busi­nesses and, in this case, hopes are very high indeed.

As the paper points out, aggreg­ate cap­ital expendit­ures by the com­pan­ies lis­ted above rose from $97bn in 2020, to $416bn in 2025 and a fore­cast of $801bn in 2026. In 2020, the sur­plus of oper­at­ing cash flow of these com­pan­ies over cap­ital spend­ing was $155bn. In 2025, they still had a cash flow sur­plus of more than $187bn. But over these years, the ratio of cap­ital spend­ing to oper­at­ing cash flows rose from 38 per cent in 2020 to nearly 69 per cent in 2025. Then, in 2026, accord­ing to the com­pan­ies’ fore­casts, cap­ital spend­ing will exceed cash flow by $93bn and the ratio of spend­ing to cash flow will hit 113 per cent. Alpha­bet and Microsoft will still spend a little less than their cash flow. But Oracle’s spend­ing will be 138 per cent above it, Amazon’s 36 per cent above it and Meta’s close to it.

As a res­ult, ever more com­plex fin­an­cial arrange­ments are being made. Thus, not for the first time, an invest­ment boom is caus­ing an explo­sion in lever­age. While the hyper­scalers’ dir­ect invest­ment is still import­ant, “the mar­ginal fin­an­cing model is shift­ing. Spe­cial­ized data cen­ter developers, REITs, infra­struc­ture funds, and private equity investors increas­ingly build or acquire facil­it­ies and lease capa­city to hyper­scalers and other large users.”

The res­ult, accord­ing to the paper, is an increas­ingly com­plex and non-trans­par­ent fin­an­cial struc­ture. In par­tic­u­lar, it notes, “pub­licly rated debt rep­res­ents only a rel­at­ively small share of the data­cen­ter fin­an­cing; much lar­ger volumes are provided through syn­dic­ated bank loans and private-credit facil­it­ies, for which little inform­a­tion is pub­licly avail­able.”

In sum, “the cent­ral issue is not simply that AI infra­struc­ture is exposed to tech­no­lo­gical and oper­at­ing risks, but that the sec­tor’s fin­an­cing struc­ture can trans­mit and amp­lify those risks.” This is his­tor­ic­ally famil­iar beha­viour. Risks for data centre own­ers include: con­cen­tra­tion in the ten­ants and also in sources of final demand; tech­no­lo­gical obsol­es­cence and so the need to scrap and replace rel­at­ively quickly; and polit­ical and oper­a­tional dif­fi­culties involved in mak­ing the invest­ments work. Moreo

Whenever earn­ings have been this low rel­at­ive to stock prices, the lat­ter have crashed

ver, van Nieuwer­burgh adds, “Chip design­ers, cloud pro­viders, data cen­ter oper­at­ors, and infra­struc­ture investors increas­ingly depend on one another through long-term con­tracts, stra­tegic invest­ments, and fin­an­cing arrange­ments.” This cre­ates fra­gil­ity.

These are not just issues for the AI sec­tor itself. The invest­ment boom is big enough to have large mac­roe­co­nomic implic­a­tions. A paper from the Fed­eral Reserve sug­ges­ted that spend­ing on com­puter hard­ware, soft­ware and data centres con­trib­uted more than a per­cent­age point to annu­al­ised quarter-over-quarter US GDP growth in the first quarter of this year, par­tially off­set by a half a per­cent­age point of GDP increase in net imports in those cat­egor­ies. Both the IMF’s World Eco­nomic Out­look and a recent Substack from Matt Klein shed light on the inter­na­tional spillovers of the global AI boom, spe­cially on to Taiwanese and South Korean products.

A cru­cial ques­tion, however, is how far the AI mania has infec­ted the stock mar­ket, above all in the US. Here some of the vul­ner­ab­il­it­ies are evid­ent. First, the Mag­ni­fi­cent Seven (Alpha­bet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia and Tesla) have, until recently, indeed been pulling the US stock mar­ket ever higher. Second, the mar­ket is at valu­ations rarely seen before, with a cyc­lic­ally adjus­ted real earn­ings yield of 2.5 per cent, which is only frac­tion­ally above the cur­rent real interest rate. This only makes sense if earn­ings from stocks are about to grow far faster than ever before. In the past, however, whenever earn­ings have been this low rel­at­ive to stock prices, the lat­ter have crashed. Is this AI-driven boom, with all its unavoid­able uncer­tain­ties about future prof­it­ab­il­ity, returns on the huge and rap­idly grow­ing invest­ment, and now the elab­or­ate fin­an­cial engin­eer­ing, going to be any dif­fer­ent?

The longer the invest­ment boom and the asso­ci­ated fin­an­cial engin­eer­ing con­tinue, the big­ger the neg­at­ive eco­nomic impact is likely to be when it ends. This does not mean that AI itself will fail to be the trans­form­at­ive tech­no­logy it seems to be, though only a spe­cies that adores play­ing Rus­sian roul­ette would tol­er­ate a busi­ness (Anthropic) whose pro­spectus says it could cre­ate “cata­strophic or exist­en­tial risks to human­ity”. New tech­no­lo­gies have often triggered stock mar­ket manias and invest­ment booms that end in busts. Recent mar­ket tremors sug­gest this could even be hap­pen­ing to AI now. A return to real­ity will come when it will come. The read­i­ness is all.

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