America’s Support for Taiwan Looks Alarmingly Fragile

7:20
Takeaways by Bloomberg AI
Donald Trump has been humiliated in the midterms, but his ability to exploit American might to cause grief abroad is not much diminished. US policy toward Iran remains uncertain, probably even in the White House. The administration is persisting in its attempts to sell Ukraine to Russia. Trump’s threats against Cuba linger.
Most serious of all is the question mark overhanging the future of Taiwan. Last spring Trump alarmed its 23 million people — and also Silicon Valley — by dismissing crucial arms sales to the world’s leading semiconductor producer as “a very good negotiating chip.” He obviously meant in parleys with China.
In May US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there had been no change in his country’s historic policy of support for Taiwan. Most people, however, including probably the Beijing leadership, take their cue from the president’s lips. These suggest a willingness to sell out the island if the price is right.
Yet thanks to its advanced chip industry, embodied by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., the island has become a critical US interest. Two Asia specialists who served in the Biden administration wrote in this week’s Foreign Affairs magazine that the Trump administration’s mixed signals about Taiwan are “a recipe for disaster.”
There is speculation that the White House could seek a grand trade bargain with China’s President Xi Jinping in which Taiwan’s freedom is placed under the hammer. Beijing may anyway feel emboldened by the US leader’s apparent indifference to the island’s wellbeing; by his strategic wavering; and by his political weakness at home.
Moreover, Trump has alienated America’s traditional European allies. In a Taiwan confrontation, it is unlikely that they would offer the US meaningful support. It would seem hazardous to enter a conflict with China alongside a US president who declines to consult, and who changes course without warning. Japan, South Korea and Australia are the only major nations that might give military assistance in resisting Chinese aggression, though even their backing would not be assured or unconditional.
Trump has no interest in exposing the US in a principled defense of Taiwanese freedom. The island’s people live a long way from America, he says. His decisions about how far to support them will be determined by his accustomed weighing up of economic and financial advantage.
It is perverse that America’s enthusiasm for defending Taiwan has waned, not only in the Oval Office but across the country, at the very moment when the island’s economic importance attains a historic high. It is now America’s fifth-largest trading partner. Bloomberg reckons that a loss of access to Taiwanese chips could cut US gross domestic product by more than 3% in a year. It could reduce the world’s production of advanced electronics by 60%, a scary number.
Meanwhile, China is making conspicuous headway in its wooing of poorer nations to purchase its artificial intelligence systems. Rival US products come with restrictions on use and abuse that offer greater security at the price of the AI’s manufacturer keeping an eye on what you are doing. American models are smarter, but Chinese diplomacy is nimbler and more calculating.
A new factor entered the Taiwan equation this week, as scandal engulfed the dominant AI chipmaker Nvidia Corp. The Trump administration’s ambitious hopes for AI supremacy rest upon expanding domestic superchip production through the US company’s partnership with Taiwan’s TSMC in Arizona and via tie-ups with other firms in Texas.
The problem for America is that while Nvidia designs cutting-edge logic chips, TSMC makes most of them. A decade or so in the future, Taiwan may be overtaken as the global pivot of such production. But, for now, whatever Trump’s ambitions for a trade deal with China, the island’s semiconductors make it vital to the US and its huge AI firms.
Yet even if the Nvidia crisis proves a White House wake-up call, the island remains vulnerable. The means for its defense are as important as the will. Nobody can fight geography: It lies close to China, far from the US. As I found when I researched a book on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Kremlin politburo’s behavior, and its ultimate retreat, were decisively influenced by the realization that Castro’s island lay just 90 miles from Florida. If it had come to shooting, the Americans held almost all the cards.
The reverse is true in Taiwan, against which the Chinese are escalating demonstrations and naval exercises. They seek to show that they can strangle it by blockade and cyberattack. And if a hot war does come, America’s missile inventory is drastically depleted, and will take years to rebuild. Most of the US Navy’s heavy metal, including aircraft carriers, has moved to the Middle East.
The Chinese respect strength and resolve; despise weakness and irresolution. President Xi achieved a notable diplomatic win earlier this year when he persuaded the White House to pause a planned $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, in return for vague promises of progress on trade talks. Thomas Wright, strategy planner at the National Security Council in the Biden administration, argues that Washington must revive its clarity of purpose in dealing with Beijing, while rearming Taiwan to make credible the notion of its self-defense.
These are fine aspirations, unlikely to be realized. Having myself always argued the case for reinforcing Taiwan’s military, it may sound contradictory to declare my own guess: that within the next decade Taiwan will enter a new relationship with China, whether or not this becomes explicit integration.
US support will remain uncertain — too much so for the island’s government to feel able indefinitely to gamble its future upon. Even after Trump goes, it is doubtful America will be willing to go to war for Taiwan.
Yet there is a big difference between the future and the here and now. Whatever Taiwan’s historic destiny, for the next few years the US would be mad to sacrifice the island, or risk encouraging China to overrun it. This is why it is urgent to provide its people with means to defend themselves, should they choose to resist armed aggression.
Xi would be foolish to embark upon an invasion, with all its risks, when China may eventually get its way without firing a shot. Unfortunately, the 73-year-old is a man in a hurry, as preoccupied as Trump with legacy, and seeking something more substantial than arches and ballrooms. Thus the danger of a showdown, even of a shoot-out, remains real, and is made greater by Trump’s vacillation.
A commitment by national leaders to stability and order is the key to averting extreme violence. Only when a US administration embraces this objective, rather than institutionalizing disruption, is there a chance of the world becoming less dangerous.
Today, America’s friends and foes are fearful that it will continue to stumble in the Gulf, to appease Vladimir Putin in Ukraine and possibly to launch a gratuitous initiative against a tottering Cuba. Most reckless of all, its mixed messages could prompt China to launch aggressive action against Taiwan.
Trump needs to tell Xi that while he is happy to bargain about all sorts of other stuff, Taiwan’s chips are so critical to America’s present needs that the island is not for sale. Not at any price. And that if China resorts to extreme measures, the US will respond in kind. Only if he injects that sort of brutal clarity into the debate will there be a prospect of averting a showdown before he leaves office.
This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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