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The end of Trump whis­per­ing

The latest crisis in rela­tions between the US and Ukraine has strong echoes of the darkest days of 2025. The infam­ous tele­vised Oval Office con­front­a­tion between JD Vance, Don­ald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy crys­tal­lised fears that Amer­ica was now on Rus­sia’s side. Those wor­ries flared up again with the Trump-Putin sum­mit in Alaska.

European lead­ers respon­ded to these pre­vi­ous crises with determ­ined Trump-whis­per­ing. They embraced Zelenskyy and coached him on how to sound grate­ful and con­cili­at­ory in his deal­ings with the US pres­id­ent. And they deluged Trump with phone calls and flat­tery, in an effort to take the roughest edges off US policy.

This time around things look dif­fer­ent. Zelenskyy is much less restrained in his remarks about Trump. He has dir­ectly accused the US of throt­tling satel­lite ser­vices in Ukraine and sug­ges­ted Trump is attrac­ted to auto­crats. The Ukrain­i­ans have also defied a US demand to stop hit­ting Rus­sian energy facil­it­ies. This week­end saw some of he biggest strikes yet on oil facil­it­ies in St Peters­burg.

Zelenskyy’s out­spoken state­ments may be driven, in large part, by anger and exas­per­a­tion. But there is also prob­ably some cal­cu­la­tion behind his change in tone. With Trump weak­en­ing in the polls and Repub­lic­ans appar­ently head­ing for defeat in the midterm elec­tions, it could be worth appeal­ing to Amer­ic­ans over the heads of the pres­id­ent and his cronies. On the cam­paign trail, even some Repub­lican can­did­ates have ques­tioned Trump’s plan to buy Rus­sian diesel. Polls sug­gest Amer­ic­ans do not share Trump’s admir­a­tion for Vladi­mir Putin.

There is also an import­ant shift under way in Europe’s approach to Rus­sia. There is a grow­ing con­sensus in European cap­it­als that the con­tin­ent’s lead­ers can no longer tol­er­ate a situ­ation where only the Amer­ic­ans are talk­ing to Putin. Chan­nels with the Rus­si­ans are already open and a call between European lead­ers and Putin may hap­pen soon.

The change in approach reflects a belief that Trump-whis­per­ing is increas­ingly inef­fect­ive — par­tic­u­larly given the pres­id­ent’s pre­oc­cu­pa­tion with the midterms and his anger at what he regards as Europe’s fail­ure to help him in Iran. The Europeans also fear US policy is largely driven by a desire for busi­ness deals with Rus­sia, rather than a coher­ent secur­ity vis­ion.

Europe’s own approach cur­rently rests on two props — sup­port for Ukraine and sanc­tions on Rus­sia. Both policies are regarded as cru­cial, par­tic­u­larly as US sup­port for Ukraine weak­ens. But dir­ect European involve­ment in peace­mak­ing efforts is also increas­ingly seen as a neces­sity — par­tic­u­larly since it is European money that is keep­ing Ukraine afloat, fol­low­ing the cut-off in US fin­an­cial aid.

The Europeans seem con­fid­ent Putin will be will­ing to talk. But the Rus­sian leader him­self is believed to be float­ing the idea of a three-way sum­mit between him­self, Trump and Xi Jin­ping of China. That kind of sum­mit would play to Rus­sia’s great-power pre­ten­sions — and would keep Ukraine and its most import­ant sup­port­ers out of the room.

Rus­sian war­i­ness about enga­ging with the Europeans may be increased by the kind of pro­pos­als that could be put on the table. If and when European talks with Putin take place, the Rus­sian leader is likely to be presen­ted with two pos­sible paths to peace. The first is to freeze the con­flict on the cur­rent line of con­trol — and in return get a guar­an­tee that Ukraine will never join Nato. The second option would be for Ukraine to cede the rest of the Don­bas to Rus­sia — but then to join Nato.

Both of those choices would be regarded as a betrayal by some in Ukraine. But, given the strong desire for peace in his coun­try, Zelenskyy might be able to sell either idea. The Europeans are much less con­fid­ent that Putin is ready to accept either. But they still think it is import­ant to start talk­ing dir­ectly to the Rus­si­ans.

Along­side the dip­lo­matic rethink, there is also grow­ing European determ­in­a­tion to become less depend­ent on Amer­ica for cru­cial cap­ab­il­it­ies — in par­tic­u­lar, the satel­lite cov­er­age provided by Starshield and Starlink. Two Finnish com­pan­ies — Nokia and Iceye — this month announced a part­ner­ship to develop satel­lite com­mu­nic­a­tions net­works for mil­it­ary and civil­ian pur­poses. But the first launches are not expec­ted until 2028 — so that can­not solve Ukraine’s imme­di­ate prob­lems.

For the moment, the Zelenskyy gov­ern­ment remains very reli­ant on US satel­lite cap­ab­il­it­ies both to defend against incom­ing attacks — and to pro- vide inform­a­tion for offens­ive opera- tions. Indeed, the Ukrain­i­ans have not given up hope that they can per­suade the US to extend satel­lite assist­ance, allow­ing them to tar­get mis­sile launch sites deep inside Rus­sia.

The fact that Ukraine is still so depend­ent on US cap­ab­il­it­ies might sug- gest that it is in Zelenskyy’s interest to con­tinue to be as obsequious as pos­sible to Trump and Elon Musk — in the hope that they will relent and provide Kyiv with the help it needs.

Instead, the Ukrain­ian leader has gone in the oppos­ite dir­ec­tion. He has even dis­cussed the pos­sib­il­ity that the US might side dir­ectly with Rus­sia against Ukraine. “He’s gone full Car­ney” is the ver­dict of one top European.

That is cer­tainly a risky strategy. But Trump has not left the Ukrain­i­ans with many bet­ter options.

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