EU countries shoot themselves in the foot when they veto sanctions 

Financial Times UK 5 Oct 2026 Mar tin Sandbu mar tin.sandbu@ft.com

 It is not a pretty pic ture: the coun try that has been most insist ent that EU mem ber states develop “stra tegic autonomy” from global powers recently forced the bloc to sub mit to pres sure from a mid dling Cent ral Asian author it arian pet ro state. Last month, France held up the six monthly renewal of sanc tions on indi vidu als and com pan ies linked to Rus sian Pres id ent Vladi mir Putin’s regime. The EU’s for eign policy rules require unan im ity for decisions on sanc tions. Paris, however, threatened to allow all the sanc tions to lapse unless the bil lion aire Alisher Usmanov was removed from the list. This, it seems, was a con di tion set by Azerbaijan for the release of French cit izens imprisoned there. Lux em bourg then fol lowed with a demand to take another olig arch off the hook. 

This is not the first betrayal of European solid ar ity over sanc tions. Greece this year held up a pre vi ous sanc tions renewal to allow a ship ping mag nate to con tinue the very luc rat ive busi ness of ship ping Rus sian gas to non-EU mar kets. Hun gary has long used its veto power for its own bene fit. But for France to behave in this way is a water shed. It is one of the founders of the EU and its second-largest mem ber state. And Pres id ent Emmanuel Mac ron’s call for stra tegic autonomy, at first dis missed as a French idée fixe, had more or less become con ven tional wis dom in the bloc. Now, however, it looks as though it was just talk. In the end France — or rather, Azerbaijan — got its way. Baku promptly released one French pris oner after EU gov ern ments struck a com prom ise in which the remain ing sanc tions were exten ded for three years rather than just six months. That, at least, means a repeat will not hap pen any time soon. But what mat ters more is how much of the EU’s geo pol it ical influ ence, such as it was, has been lost in the pro cess. Paris has in effect put the pos i tion of EU cap it als on sanc tions up for sale to third coun tries. Quite aside from under min ing the “com mon” in the EU’s com mon secur ity and defence policy, this fur ther encour ages rogue states to hold European coun tries to ransom, for example by jail ing their cit izens.

The even big ger loss is the poten tial for a more stra tegic sanc tions policy, which now seems fur ther from being real ised than ever. To give credit where it’s due: the EU has man aged to assemble an impress ive 21 sanc tions pack ages against Rus sia. These have hurt the Rus sian eco nomy and shrunk the resources avail able to sus tain its war effort. But the EU should aim higher than the react ive pun ish ment it has meted out, par tially and too weakly enforced. A truly stra tegic sanc tions policy delib er ately links sanc tions decisions to demands made of oth ers. That requires the abil ity to cred ibly threaten spe cific sanc tions (or the tight en ing of exist ing ones) before other states act to harm EU val ues or interests, and to prom ise loosen ing on strict con di tions. 

Such an abil ity is elu sive while 27 veto-wield ing mem ber states all pur sue their own nar row goals — but it would earn Europe a seat at the table when Ukraine’s future is determ ined and give it greater influ ence on Israel’s con duct in the Middle East. On top of boost ing the EU’s stra tegic rel ev ance, that would also serve its eco nomic interests. The path to achiev ing this is well known: it is to shift sanc tions and pos sibly other aspects of for eign policy to qual i fied major ity vot ing (QMV), as provided for in the EU treat ies. The last push to do so was a “friends of QMV” group of mem ber states formed a few years ago. Iron ic ally enough, France joined the group, although it is doubt ful its heart was ever in it. 

Unfor tu nately, the cur rent pro spects for such a move, which itself requires unan im ity, are poor. However, now that the exist ing pro ced ure is being undermined, the need for it is greater than ever. Some mem ber states fear that their vital interests would be dam aged by major ity rule mak ing. But in a world sud denly more filled with adversar ies and enemies, going it alone is to accept being divided and ruled by oth ers — even for the biggest coun tries, as the French exper i ence shows. EU coun tries should remem ber that it is pre cisely when major ity rule mak ing has stopped them from under cut ting each other com mer cially — in trade, com pet i tion and the single mar ket — that they have flour ished col lect ively. Major ity vot ing on sanc tions would not by itself improve policy. Brus sels’ pusil lan im ity in robustly using the EU’s anti-coer cion instru ment, or even con- ven tional trade policy, against the US or China shows that. But it is a neces sary con di tion for pro gress. Mac ron could redeem him self by ral ly ing behind a shift now.