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 CHINESE ACADEMIC CRAP

"As China has climbed the rank­ings, many crit­ics have poin­ted to the indus­trial scale of fraud­u­lent or poor-qual­ity research, driven in part by incent­ives that reward pub­lic­a­tion volume in ten­ure and pro­mo­tion decisions. Even met­rics designed to meas­ure a piece of research’s impact, such as cita­tions, have at times been dis­tor­ted by Chinese-au­thored papers being unne­ces­sar­ily cited by fel­low aca­dem­ics.

Ivan Oransky, co-founder of Retrac­tion Watch, which tracks pub­lic­a­tion trends, says: “China’s gov­ern­ment has been intens­ively gam­ing those met­rics using incent­ives that have led to wide­spread mis­con­duct, includ­ing paper mill activ­ity.” Paper mills are com­pan­ies paid to cre­ate fake stud­ies."

The ascent of China’s uni­versit­ies

Dec­ades of invest­ment by Beijing have trans­formed the coun­try’s aca­demic insti­tu­tions des­pite linger­ing ques­tions about research qual­ity and intel­lec­tual free­dom.

Tsinghua University, ranked 17th in the world, is one of a small group of elite institutions singled out by Beijing for progressively larger budgets over time

In a field in rural Pakistan, the fruits of Chinese edu­ca­tional expan­sion are ripen­ing. Waqas Ahmad, an agri­cul­tural engin­eer in Fais­alabad, checks an app on his smart­phone that mon­it­ors the health of his fields, using satel­lite data to identify which areas need more water or fer­til­iser.

“This app can save you lots of rupees wasted on excess water, diesel and man­power,” he says.

The app, which fea­tures an AI-gen­er­ated Urdu voice, was developed at a nearby uni­versity as part of a part­ner­ship with a research insti­tu­tion from south­ern China — one of a grow­ing num­ber of such insti­tutes extend­ing the reach of China’s ter­tiary edu­ca­tion sys­tem bey­ond its bor­ders.

Across Asia, Africa and the Middle East, hun­dreds of inter­na­tional off­shoots and col­lab­or­a­tions have been estab­lished by Chinese uni­versit­ies in the past dec­ade. These out­posts are cap­it­al­ising on the rising prestige of China’s uni­versit­ies, which have under­gone a three-dec­ade trans­form­a­tion in both scale and qual­ity.

In 2010, only one main­land Chinese insti­tu­tion ranked in the top 50 of the QS World Uni­versity Rank­ings, a closely watched global league table. By 2025, that num­ber had risen to five, and they were posi­tioned higher up the table.

“Chinese uni­versit­ies’ climb­ing in global rank­ings is real. It’s not a ‘mys­tery bounce’ but the res­ult of three dec­ades of sus­tained, tar­geted invest­ment,” says Denis Simon, an Amer­ican aca­demic who pre­vi­ously served as exec­ut­ive vice-chan­cel­lor of Duke Kun­shan Uni­versity in Jiangsu province.

China’s ascent — under­pinned by heavy spend­ing on sci­ence and tech­no­logy — con­trasts sharply with the Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s attacks on research fund­ing at lead­ing US cam­puses. Against that back­drop, and amid rising anti-Chinese sen­ti­ment in the US, Chinese uni­versit­ies have increas­ingly suc­ceeded in attract­ing prom­in­ent aca­dem­ics back home.

While linger­ing ques­tions remain about the qual­ity of much of the research, over­all levels of stu­dent sat­is­fac­tion and the lim­its of their global appeal, experts say their rising stature and influ­ence on the coun­try’s tech­no­logy sec­tor can­not be denied.

“China has been train­ing many more sci­ent­ists and engin­eers than we do, fil­ing more pat­ents, pub­lish­ing many sci­entific papers,” says Joanne Car­ney, chief gov­ern­ment rela­tions officer at the Amer­ican Asso­ci­ation for the Advance­ment of Sci­ence.

“We’ve been see­ing the ascen­sion of China invest­ing as a per­cent­age of its GDP, so it’s not sur­pris­ing to see that they are at our heels if not sur­pass­ing us in some areas.”

China’s invest­ment in higher edu­ca­tion began in earn­est in the 1980s under Deng Xiaop­ing, who recog­nised how far China had fallen behind the west and Japan dur­ing the Mao era. Suc­cess­ive lead­ers — Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jin­ping — each intro­duced policies to strengthen the com­pet­it­ive­ness of China’s uni­versit­ies.

The Min­istry of Edu­ca­tion has expli­citly sought to raise the stature of its uni­versit­ies by rais­ing their pos­i­tion in the inter­na­tional rank­ings. The invest­ments have had clear res­ults, as Chinese uni­versit­ies have stead­ily climbed the rank­ings over the past two dec­ades, largely due to the scale of their research out­put. The edu­ca­tion min­istry has singled out a small group of elite insti­tu­tions, led by Pek­ing and Tsinghua uni­versit­ies, for pro­gress­ively lar­ger budgets over time.

A report by the US-based Cen­ter for Secur­ity and Emer­ging Tech­no­logy found that in 2019, a group of 10 elite Chinese uni­versit­ies each had a budget exceed­ing $5bn a year. Among those uni­versit­ies were Pek­ing and Tsinghua, both in Beijing, which are placed 14th and 17th respect­ively in the latest QS World Uni­versity Rank­ings. Still, the top 10 remains dom­in­ated by Oxbridge and elite US schools such as MIT and Har­vard.

China is not alone in try­ing to use invest­ment in ter­tiary edu­ca­tion to improve eco­nomic pro­ductiv­ity and move up the man­u­fac­tur­ing value chain, but experts say it stands out in the con­sist­ency of its spend­ing.

“China has inves­ted con­sist­ently, year after year for three dec­ades,” says Arnout Jac­obs, pres­id­ent of Springer Nature Group’s Greater China oper­a­tions.

“Many coun­tries, when the eco­nomy is doing well, make one-off com­mit­ments to fund research. Five years later, those in power for­get about the pledge. In China, poli­cy­makers have doubled down, and invest­ment con­tin­ues to grow.

Evid­ence of rising qual­ity can be seen in Chinese rep­res­ent­a­tion in lead­ing journ­als such as Sci­ence, Nature and Cell. Holden Thorp, editor-in-chief of the Sci­ence fam­ily of journ­als, says 14 per cent of papers accep­ted in Sci­ence in 2025 were from China, the second­largest share after the US, at 45 per cent.

Some of this research has trans­lated into tech­no­lo­gical break­throughs that have tur­bocharged Chinese indus­trial com­pet­it­ive­ness — from labs that developed power­ful bat­tery tech­no­lo­gies later used by lead­ing com­pan­ies in the elec­tric vehicle sec­tor, includ­ing CATL and BYD, to biotech com­pan­ies such as BGI Gen­om­ics.

As China has climbed the rank­ings, many crit­ics have poin­ted to the indus­trial scale of fraud­u­lent or poor-qual­ity research, driven in part by incent­ives that reward pub­lic­a­tion volume in ten­ure and pro­mo­tion decisions. Even met­rics designed to meas­ure a piece of research’s impact, such as cita­tions, have at times been dis­tor­ted by Chineseau­thored papers being unne­ces­sar­ily cited by fel­low aca­dem­ics.

Ivan Oransky, co-founder of Retrac­tion Watch, which tracks pub­lic­a­tion trends, says: “China’s gov­ern­ment has been intens­ively gam­ing those met­rics using incent­ives that have led to wide­spread mis­con­duct, includ­ing paper mill activ­ity.” Paper mills are com­pan­ies paid to cre­ate fake stud­ies.

In 2025, he recor­ded nearly 3,000 retrac­tions of Chinese-authored papers from journ­als, com­pared with 177 for US authors.

But Beth­any Allen, head of the Aus­tralian Stra­tegic Policy Insti­tute’s China invest­ig­a­tions pro­gramme, cau­tions against dis­miss­ing Chinese uni­versit­ies by focus­ing on the volume of lowqual­ity papers. “Chinese uni­versit­ies are dra­mat­ic­ally increas­ing their highqual­ity out­put, even when you take into account how the num­bers are inflated. Focus­ing only on mis­con­duct is not see­ing the forest for the trees,” she says.

Experts say that high rank­ings do not neces­sar­ily trans­late into a bet­ter over­all under­gradu­ate exper­i­ence.

“Rising rank is a strong sig­nal of research capa­city and vis­ib­il­ity but not a com­plete ver­dict on over­all insti­tu­tional qual­ity,” says Simon, the Amer­ican aca­demic.

Research from Stan­ford Uni­versity in 2021 found Chinese under­gradu­ates in Stem sub­jects showed a decline in crit­ical think­ing skills dur­ing the final two years of their degrees. By con­trast, US stu­dents entered uni­versity with sim­ilar levels of crit­ical think­ing but made sig­ni­fic­ant gains by gradu­ation.

Peter Hessler, a writer and former cre­at­ive writ­ing teacher at Sichuan Uni­versity-Pitt­s­burgh Insti­tute (SUPI) from 2019-21, says the find­ings match his exper­i­ence. “Chinese stu­dents work much harder in gaozhong [high school] than they do at uni­versity, which is the oppos­ite of the US,” he says.

Part of the explan­a­tion lies in the gaokao, the highly com­pet­it­ive uni­versity entrance exam taken at 18, which can determ­ine stu­dents’ life tra­ject­or­ies. “The Amer­ican sys­tem is cre­at­ing stu­dents at the uni­versity. In China, the stu­dents have already been cre­ated by the time they arrive,” says Hessler.

China’s grow­ing aca­demic clout is crys­tal­lising at a time when many Brit­ish and Amer­ican uni­versit­ies are cut­ting research spend­ing.

The Trump admin­is­tra­tion has sought to stem fund­ing to uni­versit­ies over­all and to restrict inter­na­tional stu­dents com­ing to the US. “The dam­age being done to the research enter­prise across our top US uni­versit­ies stands in marked con­trast to the sys­tem­atic efforts in China to sup­port major sci­entific ini­ti­at­ives,” says Nick Dirks, pres­id­ent and chief exec­ut­ive of the New York Academy of Sci­ences. “There are already signs that in some areas of research and devel­op­ment, the US is fall­ing behind.”

Against an increas­ingly uncer­tain back­ground in the west, China’s prom­ise of stable fund­ing has become a com­pet­it­ive advant­age in recruit­ing tal­ent.

“China is increas­ingly able to keep and attract top domestic tal­ent and recruit inter­na­tion­ally — helped by improved pay pack­ages, facil­it­ies and prestige feed­back loops,” says Simon.

Beijing has tar­geted schol­ars in stra­tegic­ally import­ant fields such as phys­ics, com­puter sci­ence and bio­logy through ini­ti­at­ives includ­ing the Thou­sand Tal­ents Pro­gramme.

One for­eign aca­demic at a lead­ing Beijing uni­versity who pre­vi­ously worked at a Brit­ish uni­versity says they received a gen­er­ous relo­ca­tion pack­age and sub­stan­tial research fund­ing. “I have a lot more time for research than I would at a Brit­ish uni­versity, where fin­an­cial con­straints cre­ate more pres­sure to teach. I also have a more abund­ant sup­ply of PhD stu­dents to work on my projects,” says the aca­demic, who declined to be named due to the uni­versity’s ban on media inter­views.

Some high-pro­file Chinese-born aca­dem­ics have returned home from the US in recent years, drawn by fund­ing oppor­tun­it­ies, recruit­ment efforts, prox­im­ity to age­ing rel­at­ives and, in some cases, con­cerns about hos­til­ity towards for­eign research­ers and visa hold­ers in the US.

Yu Xie, Jun­ming Huang and col­leagues at Prin­ceton Uni­versity’s Paul and Mar­cia Wythes Cen­ter on Con­tem­por­ary China have tracked 80 to 90 pro­fess­ors return­ing annu­ally from the US to China in recent years.

While most of the migrat­ing aca­dem­ics are Chinese nation­als, its uni­versit­ies have also recruited prom­in­ent for­eign schol­ars. Caucher Birkar, a Fields Medal-win­ning Ira­nian-Kur­d­ish math­em­atician, joined Tsinghua Uni­versity in 2021 to co-found a research lab focused on geo­metry.

China is close to sur­pass­ing the US in total expendit­ure on R&D, with China spend­ing $781bn and the US $823bn in 2023, accord­ing to data from the OECD. By con­trast in 2007, China spent $136bn com­pared with $462bn by the US.

The OECD also cal­cu­lates that China spends, on aver­age, $305,000 on R&D costs per researcher, which is more than the European aver­age of $268,000. This lar­ger budget can also go fur­ther in China, where lab equip­ment and labour costs are often lower.

In the past, Chinese uni­versit­ies have struggled to retain their inter­na­tional tal­ent. Many for­eign aca­dem­ics tend to stay in China for short ten­ures, either because of the lack of diversity at their insti­tu­tions or because of polit­ical sens­it­iv­it­ies that com­plic­ate integ­ra­tion.

Hessler’s con­tract at SUPI was not renewed des­pite his courses’ pop­ular­ity with stu­dents. His ten­ure was marked by anonym­ous, unsub­stan­ti­ated claims on social media that he had insul­ted the Chinese gov­ern­ment. He says that it remains unclear why the uni­versity did not renew his con­tract, but the back­drop of rising ten­sions with the US and heightened cen­sor­ship dur­ing the pan­demic is likely to have played a role.

Reflect­ing on his exper­i­ence at SUPI, Hessler says it is dif­fi­cult for for­eign fac­ulty mem­bers to integ­rate into Chinese uni­versit­ies and to nav­ig­ate the myriad polit­ical sens­it­iv­it­ies that could land them in trouble. Stu­dents are encour­aged to report on their class­mates and teach­ers who speak out of line on polit­ics, while many classrooms are equipped with mon­it­or­ing devices.

“It cre­ates a lack of trust. Stu­dents and teach­ers have to be care­ful for fear of bein­gre­por­ted. It’s hard to quantify the cost, but it does limit devel­op­ment and makes it harder for out­siders to integ­rate,” he says.

The pre­dom­in­ance of Man­darin and lim­ited pro­fes­sional oppor­tun­it­ies for for­eign­ers in China have long con­strained the uni­versit­ies’ global appeal. The Covid-19 pan­demic also depleted China’s inter­na­tional stu­dent body.

Such con­straints may ulti­mately limit how far Chinese cam­puses can become inter­na­tional melt­ing pots. But that may mat­ter less as they expand their inter­na­tional foot­print.

Beijing has long sought to build uni­versit­ies with global reach as a means to project its own power and to export its tech­no­lo­gies, says Allen of Aus­tralia’s Stra­tegic Policy Insti­tute. “China has seen how hav­ing glob­ally lead­ing uni­versit­ies, par­tic­u­larly in sci­ence and tech­no­logy, has given the US enorm­ous sway. But Chinese uni­versit­ies, due to lan­guage, cul­tural and polit­ical reas­ons, tend to be exceed­ingly poor places for inter­na­tional stu­dents,” she says.

Instead of try­ing to match west­ern insti­tu­tions in the diversity of their stu­dent bod­ies, they are increas­ingly going abroad them­selves, par­tic­u­larly in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, to estab­lish insti­tutes and research part­ner­ships aimed at train­ing the next gen­er­a­tion of for­eign tal­ent.

At Fais­alabad’s Uni­versity of Agri­cul­ture, part­ner­ships with Chinese insti­tu­tions are provid­ing gen­er­ous schol­ar­ships and research oppor­tun­it­ies. The num­ber of Man­darin lan­guage learners there has doubled to almost 1,000 in just two years, teach­ers say, as they seek to join the 29,000 Pakistanis study­ing in China. Such part­ner­ships also provide a con­duit for Chinese com­pan­ies to export their tech­no­logy, such as the farm­ers’ app, to friendly coun­tries.

Chinese research part­ners in Pakistan are work­ing with local uni­versit­ies to deploy facial recog­ni­tion, sur­veil­lance and drone tech­no­logy to aid secur­ity ser­vices.

“China wants to reduce US hege­monic influ­ence in edu­ca­tion, sci­ence and tech­no­logy. It can do this by offer­ing itself as an altern­at­ive — by strik­ing part­ner­ships around the world and becom­ing the place coun­tries turn to when they need things,” Allen says.

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