Why Japan's election matters for the world
Our columnists look at the implications of the Feb. 8 vote on their regions
Sanae Takaichi, Japan's prime minister and leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, attends an election event in Tokyo on Jan. 27, the first day of campaigning for the Feb. 8 lower house election. © Reuters
Four regular columnists for Nikkei Asia take a look at Japan's Feb. 8 lower house election, and discuss what the implications of the poll will be for their respective regions.
China would prefer a weakened Takaichi
David Tingxuan Zhang is a Washington, DC-based analyst at Trivium China, a strategic advisory firm. The views expressed here are his own.
Japan's upcoming election carries profound implications for regional politics, and the stakes are particularly high for Japan-China relations.
Since November, the bilateral relationship has experienced what may be its most rapid and dramatic deterioration in recent memory. What began as a diplomatic standoff has swiftly metastasized into economic, cultural and security dimensions, with no signs of de-escalation. This year, Beijing has continued to lay pressure through measures like rare-earth export controls, making clear that an explicit retraction of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's Taiwan remarks is a precondition for any thaw.
Against this backdrop, Beijing will be watching this election with intense interest and considerable unease. Chinese policymakers view Takaichi as having fundamentally undermined Japan's long-standing strategic ambiguity on Taiwan -- a frustration reminiscent of sentiments toward the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Should the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) secure a lower house majority, Beijing will brace for a prolonged period of frozen ties. Given the escalating Chinese accusations regarding Tokyo's alleged "militarization," further tensions -- including in the security domain -- cannot be ruled out.
A weakened Takaichi emerging from the election would be Beijing's preferred outcome. Opposition parties would gain greater leverage to constrain her agenda on defense spending and, potentially, compel a more balanced posture that accommodates domestic voices favoring reconciliation with China.
A better scenario for Beijing, of course, would be a victory by the newly formed Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) opposition. Chinese strategists harbor no illusions about a dramatic pivot -- the CRA remains committed to Japan's regional security frameworks, and Beijing has its own history of disputes with co-leader and former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda over maritime sovereignty. Yet the opposition coalition has adopted a notably less confrontational tone throughout the current crisis. More importantly, a change of government would provide Beijing political cover to improve ties without appearing weak -- an opening similar to what the previous administration of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba offered before his departure cut short that rapprochement.
U.S. hopes Japan will implement greater defense and economic reforms
Riley Walters is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.
U.S. policymakers are watching this election to see if Tokyo can find political stability, and whether it will lead to Japan implementing greater defense and economic reforms.
This is an important year as Tokyo undergoes reviews of its essential security and defense documents, space policy, defense equipment controls, and foreign investment and economic security laws. American policymakers will want to see changes that align with their own interests and possibly increase U.S.-Japan business opportunities.
This election will be the first real political test for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. We'll see if her high approval ratings mean anything for bringing stability to the politically fractured Diet. Even gaining a modest number of seats should be a big win for her against her party's string of losses in the previous elections. And creating some political certainty will likewise help Takaichi toward realizing her own vision for a safer and more prosperous Japan.
Takaichi has expressed an interest in building a stronger, more self-dependent Japan that can take a greater leadership role across the Indo-Pacific region. And this isn't too far off from the Trump administration's interests of having America's allies take greater agency in the security of their regions. There's a mutual interest in increasing Japan's ability to protect itself, whether through greater defensive efforts or economic security. Neither government wants to see an overreliance on countries like China anymore, especially for critical supply chains.
Regardless of the election results, the most important thing for the U.S.-Japan relationship right now is making sure the U.S.-Japan investment deal makes progress. U.S. President Donald Trump's recent threat of tariffs against South Korea shows domestic politics is no excuse for slow implementation, and the last thing a new government in Tokyo should want is to start off the year renegotiating tariffs.
Closer cooperation with South Korea is essential
Joseph Yi is an associate professor of political science at Hanyang University (Seoul).
As Japan approaches its next general election, much of the discussion understandably centers on inflation, energy security and demographic decline. But the election also carries a deeper significance: How Japan defines its role in a rapidly evolving international order.
For decades, stability in East Asia rested on American military and strategic leadership. That era is not ending, but it is changing. The U.S. is increasingly preoccupied with domestic polarization and challenges closer to home in the Western Hemisphere. This does not mean Washington will abandon Asia, but it does mean that regional democracies assume greater responsibility for defending the liberal rights and norms that have underwritten postwar peace and prosperity.
In this context, I hope Japan's next government will prioritize building a principled and forward-looking partnership with South Korea. Japan and South Korea are the region's two most advanced liberal democracies: technologically sophisticated, globally integrated and deeply exposed to the consequences of authoritarian expansion. Historical grievances have too often constrained cooperation. Yet shared interests and values are far more durable foundations for the future.
Such partnership should not be limited to security coordination. It should also be normative. A credible democratic partnership demonstrates respect for civil liberties, freedom of religion, and minority rights even when doing so is politically uncomfortable. This includes protecting the rights of controversial religious groups such as the Unification Church, whose members in both Japan and South Korea deserve legal equality regardless of public sentiment. It also includes defending the dignity and social inclusion of North Korean residents in Japan, who remain vulnerable to discrimination despite generations of residence.
Beyond their borders, Japan and South Korea should speak clearly about the moral costs of repression in North Korea and China, where basic freedoms of speech, belief, and movement remain constrained, and exercise thoughtful diplomacy to promote such freedoms. Likewise, both countries have a vital stake in Taiwan's democracy, not only for strategic reasons, but also because its fate will signal whether democratic self-government can endure under sustained authoritarian pressure.
Elections shape priorities, rhetoric and the limits of what leaders believe their publics will support. My hope is that Japan's upcoming election will strengthen voices that see cooperation with South Korea not as a concession to the past, but as an investment in a democratic future -- one in which regional leadership is defined not only by power, but also by the consistent defense of human dignity and individual freedoms.
Vote will determine if Japan emerges as a more autonomous strategic actor
Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the independent New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin.
The upcoming election is shaping up to be one of the most consequential political contests Japan has faced in decades, largely because it will determine whether Japan decisively locks in a new strategic orientation at home and abroad. The vote will effectively function as a referendum on whether Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's more assertive approach to economic security, global engagement and China receives a democratic mandate or stalls amid political fragmentation.
The election outcome will also signal whether China's model of economic coercion is effective against a major U.S. ally. Beijing has deployed a full-spectrum pressure campaign against Takaichi's four-month administration -- punitive measures designed to hurt Japanese business interests and undermine domestic support for her government.
A Takaichi victory would represent a significant setback for China, signaling that Japanese voters are prepared to absorb real economic pain in exchange for greater strategic autonomy. Reducing exposure to Chinese economic pressure is also essential for navigating a more coercive global order, one in which U.S. President Donald Trump has shown little hesitation in pressuring even close allies.
Equally important is how the election intersects with Japan's international role, especially in the Global South. Under Takaichi, engagement with key developing countries has become a core pillar of economic resilience. The campaign has elevated "Sanaenomics," a strategy that emphasizes supply-chain diversification, technological co-creation and reduced dependence on China. Countries such as India, Vietnam and the Philippines are positioned not only as alternative manufacturing hubs under a "China-plus-one" strategy, but also as long-term partners in energy, AI governance and critical infrastructure.
The election thus has implications far beyond Japan. A clear mandate would accelerate Japan's shift toward a more forward-leaning, technology-driven diplomacy, aimed at out-competing -- rather than accommodating -- Chinese influence. Conversely, a weaker or divided outcome would slow this transition, as Japan enters an era of fragmented, coalition-based bargaining.
In short, the vote will help determine whether Japan emerges as a more autonomous strategic actor or remains vulnerable to external pressure in an era of weaponized interdependence.
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