Xi Jinping's historic purge of China's military: 5 things to know
Gutting of top brass may lower short-term risk to Taiwan but raise long-term danger
Zhang Youxia, center, then the newly elected vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, swears an oath with commission members He Weidong and Li Shangfu during the National People's Congress in Beijing in March 2023. All have since been purged. © Reuters
HONG KONG/SHANGHAI -- China's highest-ranking military official under Xi Jinping was brought down in a fresh purge over the weekend, sparking existential questions for the People's Liberation Army along with China watchers worldwide.
The showdown provides a rare glimpse into power struggles under President Xi, whose ever-tightening grip has threatened even those perceived to be his closest political allies. The dramatic shake-up could also have implications for the superpower rivalry with the U.S. and the prospect of a future conflict over Taiwan.
Here are five things to know.
What just happened?
Top Gen. Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, was placed under investigation for alleged "serious disciplinary and legal offenses," according to a Saturday statement from the Ministry of National Defense. Another general, CMC Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli, also came under a probe for the same allegations.
Zhang and Xi had a long relationship dating back to their early days as fellow "second-generation reds," a term for the descendants of revolutionary-era Chinese Communist Party leaders. Zhang's late father was a heavyweight in the PLA and one of the "founding generals" of the People's Republic of China. Zhang fought in the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts in the 1980s and was first elevated to the CMC in 2018, during the first session of the 13th National People's Congress.
A Wall Street Journal report on Sunday said Zhang was accused of leaking secrets about China's nuclear weapons programs to the U.S. and accepting bribes for personnel moves. Nikkei Asia could not independently verify these accusations.
What has Beijing said?
The Saturday announcement that shocked the world was only a brief, one-line statement, similar to past waves of removals of military officials. Later that evening, the military mouthpiece PLA Daily published a strongly worded editorial detailing Zhang's and Liu's alleged crimes and vowing to carry on the fight against corruption within the military apparatus.
The article said the two generals "seriously betrayed the trust and expectations of the party central committee and the CMC" and "fostered political and corruption problems that undermined the party's leadership."
Such wording on politics had been absent from previous PLA Daily editorials regarding other purges. This stirred speculation about a high-stakes struggle between different segments of the PLA and even talk of an attempted military coup in Beijing.
The phrasing by the Defense Ministry that Zhang was placed under investigation after a "study conducted by the party center" was crucial, according to Sonny Lo, an honorary professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong. It emphasizes, he said, that the military must be under the leadership of the CCP.
"The most important implication of the recent and ongoing purge of Chinese military leaders is the dynamics of civilian-military relations," Lo said.
He explained that unlike past Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping who built authority through wartime, later civilian leaders including Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi have lacked comparable military experience, making their relationship with the armed forces politically significant and sensitive. Under Jiang, the military was initially allowed to run commercial businesses, before tighter civilian control was imposed in the early 1990s.
More recently, corruption is understood to have seeped into the military through its control of procurement contracts, especially as military modernization requires leaders to work with private-sector executives in the military-industrial complex, Lo said.
In what state does the latest purge leave the CMC?
After Zhang and Liu's ouster, the seven-member CMC is a shadow of its former self. Only two members are still standing, including Xi himself as chairman, and Zhang Shengmin, the secretary of the CMC's discipline inspection commission. Zhang was promoted to the CMC last October and is also a member of Xi's Rocket Force, key to Beijing's nuclear weapons buildup.
"The PLA is in disarray, with a major leadership void until the next 'two sessions' meeting in March, or possibly longer," said Lyle Morris, senior fellow on foreign policy and national security at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis, referring to the annual meetings of China's legislature and political advisory body. "It's safe to say the PLA has not been in this much turmoil since the Cultural Revolution. It means all senior PLA officers with connections to Zhang and Liu are under scrutiny, and distrust is at an all-time high."
He Weidong, another CMC vice chairman who shared the same rank with Zhang Youxia, was brought down by corruption charges together with eight other senior military officials last year, including Adm. Miao Hua and Lt. Gen. He Hongjun.
From March 2023 to mid-October 2025, around 20 generals were purged. Six were from the Rocket Force, which controls China's arsenal of land-based ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional.
"It remains to be seen how the top echelon of the PLA leaders will be stabilized," said Lo, adding that while the purges have coincided with military professionalization and modernization, some officers might want more stable leadership rather than a relentless anti-corruption drive.
What are the implications for Taiwan?
Observers can only make educated guesses, but many say the political upheaval in the CMC reduces the likelihood of an immediate direct threat to democratic Taiwan, which China claims for itself. However, a more loyalist Chinese military could eventually spell trouble, as Xi has repeatedly called unification "unstoppable" and vowed to take the island by force if necessary.
"Xi's purge of the top brass makes China's threat toward Taiwan weaker in the short term but stronger in the long term," said Neil Thomas, a fellow on Chinese politics at the Asia Society.
For now, he said, "a high command in disarray makes it even more of a gamble for Xi to risk a massive military escalation" against Taipei. But "in the long term, a less corrupt, more loyal and more capable military could more credibly coerce Taipei into submission and deter Washington from intervening. China's military modernization continues, but having weapons is different from being able to deploy them well."
Amanda Hsiao, director of Eurasia Group's China practice, made a similar point.
"Xi's political purification campaign is meant to improve the effectiveness of the military so that it can succeed in future operations, such as forcing Taiwan to unify with China," she said. "But in the short-term, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan seems even less likely.
"The removal of two senior generals with combat experience leaves a big gap in the chain of command and suggests that the Chinese leadership is not confident enough in its own military to take such a risk."
At the end of last year, China launched some of its biggest military drills around Taiwan so far. James Char, assistant professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies of Nanyang Technological University of Singapore, said Taipei and its partners should brace for more of the same for the time being.
"Overall, we can expect Beijing to stick to military operations below the threshold of war in the near- to medium-term," he said.
What happens next?
The purge was widely read as a fortification of Xi's grip on the military and a major step to root out potential political opponents.
"The moves suggest that Xi has consolidated his power and influence over the PLA in unprecedented ways," said Asia Society's Morris. "There will certainly be pushback from elements of the old guard of the PLA, especially factions loyal to Zhang. But Xi is confident enough in his control over the PLA to undertake such a dramatic action."
Asia Society's Thomas noted that there are over 18 months until the next Communist Party Congress in late 2027, which will select a new Central Commission, which will in turn appoint a new CMC.
Xi "wants to rejuvenate the PLA as a less corrupt force that is totally loyal to his agenda," Thomas said. "Xi may wait until then to elevate a new generation of military leaders. He could use this time to conduct intensive vetting of candidates to try and weed out the influence of existing patronage relations."
Another point to watch is whether Xi downgrades the PLA's role in politics, such as "by reforming the CMC or removing PLA generals from the Politburo," Thomas added.
Despite the power vacuum in the military, day-to-day operations are likely go on as usual, while Xi will likely install loyalists from the younger generation, argued Char.
"The PLA's deep bench means there will always be younger and more professional officers to take over from their cashiered predecessors," he said.
"Zhang Youxia's downfall now also officially brings us into the 'late Xi' period, since Zhang is the last senior PLA officer to have been at Xi Jinping's side in the CMC since the 18th Party Congress," Char said. "Everyone else still serving in the PLA can be said to owe their promotion to Xi himself."
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