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Supplication is Europe’s only Trump policy

Robert Shrimsley robert.shrimsley@ft.com

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Two words now sum up European policy towards Donald Trump’s United States: strategic supplication. The countries of Nato, including the UK, will render unto Caesar that which he declares to be his — in the hope that he does not ask for too much and looks kindly on their most urgent requests.

This perhaps explains the muted reactions to Trump’s latest military and diplomatic claims on Venezuela and Greenland. European leaders may talk a bigger game but this week much of the pretence has been stripped away. Donald Trump’s senior adviser, Stephen Miller was more succinct: “We are a superpower and we are going to conduct ourselves as a superpower.”

The former French premier Gabriel Attal says Europeans are now “powerless spectators of the unravelling of global rules”. The world will be “governed by force” and those who lament the loss of an international order “no longer have the means for such indignation”.

One might argue it was long thus. There have been plenty of cases where the US overrode the concerns of Nato partners. Lord Ricketts, Britain’s former national security adviser, reminds people of Ronald Reagan’s 1983 invasion of Grenada, a huge embarrassment to Margaret Thatcher’s government. For all her private rage, she knew she had to pick her fights with the US and hold her tongue in public.

But there are crucial differences. The first is the unique nature of the Trump regime. The president’s imperial court is utterly centred round his personality and idées fixes. Where once there were other routes into American policymaking — the Pentagon or state department — decisions now flow through Trump and his coterie.

The second is the loss of a shared ideology or analysis. There were sometimes splits (Harold Wilson refused to send troops to Vietnam) but American security policy reflected a worldview shared by western Europe, primarily opposing communism or, later, jihadi terror. A president did not need persuading of the Russian threat.

What ideology there is in Trump’s outlook is often turned against Nato allies, with a determination to spread Maga values across Europe and destabilise liberal governments.

A third difference is Trump’s rejection and indeed sabotage of an international order America can no longer control. He sees only a world divided between the strong and weak.

Finally, as befits a transactional and non-ideological presidency, virtue is no longer its own reward. Trump expects a return and does not fear turning America’s economic power against allies.

Without the traditional alignment of ideals, how do you manage a mercurial president upon whom your security still depends? Recognition of these hard truths helps explain the tremulous response to both the Venezuela coup and his threats to Greenland. Western European leaders will not waste diplomatic capital on Venezuela. They have bigger fish to fry. Their focus is rightly and overwhelmingly on keeping the US onside on Ukraine, where diplomacy is bearing some fruit. This strategic priority will not be jeopardised with pointless declaiming about a lost international order.

On Greenland, European leaders did ultimately muster a hands-off statement. Defiance may help head off the worst outcome. Since a US invasion would spell the end of Nato, Europe has an incentive to ensure it does not come to that. So, in fact, does the US.

But it is hard to believe Denmark will not be forced into some form of accommodation with Trump over Greenland. The first pitch will be a pledge to step up Nato presence and security there, but if the president’s aims are primarily territorial and economically extractive something more substantial may yet be forced on the Danes.

Such prioritisation makes life uncomfortable for all European leaders. For Keir Starmer, this is especially true. Foreign policy was considered one of the prime minister’s successes. (Absurdly he is attacked as “never here Keir” for spending time on crises with a direct bearing on the UK). Against calls for a more combative stance towards Trump, he struggles to communicate geopolitical realities.

There is only one alternative approach. More military might. Not only does Trump want to see this, it might also increase his respect for Europe’s views. But the UK and Europe do not have sufficient hard power. They talk up higher defence spending but Germany aside, few are rushing. Starmer, for example, has committed to raise UK defence spending to 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2035. On Ukraine, the UK is promising forces it barely has. This is simply not serious.

Aside from the lack of military might, national divisions are inhibiting the EU’s economic clout and constraining a coherent security policy. Europe punches way below its potential weight.

The uncomfortable reality for Europe’s leaders is a US they need but no longer trust. They must play nice, prior- itise the urgent issues — in this case Ukraine — while recognising their security guarantor believes only in a zero- sum world of strongmen, spheres of influence and economic returns.

Until western Europe commits to its own defence, its only tactic is to try to retain a voice at the American Caesar’s court. For now, calculated abasement is the only foreseeable policy.

Sup­plic­a­tion is Europe’s only Trump policy

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