America's Indo-Pacific strategy moves at the pace of Trump's impulses
President has sidelined process, softened on China, surprised Cambodia while unsettling everyone
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during the ASEAN-U.S. Summit in Kuala Lumpur on Oct. 26. © Reuters
Derek Grossman is a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Southern California. He formerly served as a senior defense analyst at RAND and as the daily intelligence briefer to the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense.
Everyone knows U.S. President Donald Trump is unpredictable. But for those who closely tracked his first-term Indo-Pacific policy, his second term has been especially jarring. The "adults" of the last administration -- figures like former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster -- are gone. In their place is a cabinet of loyalists who rarely challenge Trump. He is now politically unrestrained, free to reshape U.S. foreign policy entirely on his own terms.
This has meant a full takeover of the U.S. interagency process by Trump's personality-driven approach. Rather than relying on coordinated talking points or structured National Security Council preparation, Trump engages foreign leaders directly and often spontaneously -- frequently in pursuit of advantages not only for the U.S., but for himself, his family and the Trump Organization.
Yet the process hasn't totally collapsed. The White House's newly released National Security Strategy lays out an ultrarealist worldview in which allies and adversaries are largely interchangeable so long as America benefits. Unlike previous strategies, this one focuses narrowly on what Trump sees as the most pressing threats, ignoring countries that do not directly factor into his priorities.
China remains one of those threats -- but the tone is notably softer than in Trump's 2017 National Security Strategy, which labeled Beijing a "revisionist" power. The publication of the new document was delayed by internal disputes over how tough the language should be, with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent ultimately winning the fight to tone it down. His goal: Preserve the positive momentum Trump believes he has built with Beijing since his meeting with Xi Jinping at APEC in October.
Surprisingly, Trump has shown little rhetorical appetite for full-blown great-power competition with China, even though it defined his first term. More striking is his apparent embrace of a "spheres of influence" approach. The strategy emphasizes defending the Western Hemisphere above all else -- effectively a new "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine -- rather than prioritizing the Indo-Pacific, which Trump advisers once called the "priority theater." In this worldview, the key competition with China is preventing Beijing from gaining influence in America's backyard.
Southeast Asia receives only instrumental attention in this strategy -- mainly as a region that can help the U.S. counter China by keeping sea-lanes open, securing supply chains, and providing access to critical minerals. Still, Trump has managed an unexpected diplomatic success with Cambodia, an authoritarian regime and chronic human-rights violator. He signed a critical minerals deal with Phnom Penh at the ASEAN summit in Malaysia and presided over a peace ceremony between Cambodia and Thailand following summer border clashes (although fighting has resumed). He also rolled back some Biden-era sanctions. Paradoxically, Cambodia has become one of the brighter spots of Trump's regional engagement.
Vietnam, however, has fared far worse than expected. Trump's decision to impose 46% "reciprocal" tariffs -- later reduced to 20% --damaged what had been a fast-growing strategic partnership. Hanoi has responded by diversifying away from the U.S. and engaging Beijing more deeply. Vietnam held its first-ever joint army exercise with China in July, inked new economic deals during Xi's visit earlier in the year and became an observer in BRICS while expanding strategic ties globally to hedge against U.S. unpredictability.
In South Asia, India remains a designated strategic partner in the new strategy, but the bilateral relationship has taken several sharp turns. Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi enjoyed a strong rapport during Modi's February visit to Washington, but ties soured over India's continued oil imports from Russia, Modi's rejection of Trump's claim that he personally ended the four-day India-Pakistan war in May and Trump's warming relationship with Islamabad. In July, Trump posted on Truth Social: "I don't care what India does with Russia. They can take their dead economies down together, for all I care."
Relations have improved somewhat since then. The two sides appear close to finalizing a trade agreement, though Modi sent a pointed message by attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin, China -- meeting with Xi and Putin -- and by later hosting Putin in India with highly publicized camaraderie.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has become an unexpected Trump priority. He has developed a working relationship with Field Marshal Asim Munir -- deeply aggravating India, which blames him for orchestrating April's terrorist attack that sparked the brief war. Pakistan has nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize and leveraged Trump's interest in critical minerals and cryptocurrency to upgrade ties.
Notably absent from the National Security Strategy are the Pacific island nations -- a glaring omission given their strategic value in countering China and their prominence during Trump's first term. His administration has taken almost no meaningful action in the region this year, leaving Pacific island leaders frustrated and increasingly susceptible to Beijing's influence.
Despite these surprises, some fundamentals remain unchanged. The U.S. still depends heavily on its treaty allies -- Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines -- it remains concerned about China's threat to Taiwan, and continues to monitor North Korea's advancing missile and nuclear programs.
But the speed, volatility and personalism of Trump's shifts in the Indo-Pacific make one thing clear: U.S. strategy now moves at the pace of Trump's impulses, not institutions. And in this region -- where allies crave predictability and adversaries exploit uncertainty -- that may prove the most consequential surprise of all.
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