Finland shows how to deal with Russian sabotage
Once it was German U-boats that threatened our merchant shipping and national survival. Now the submarine menace is back, but this time targeting the vital flows of energy and data that connect the British Isles to our neighbours. Only a smidgen (about 1 per cent) of our internet traffic goes by satellite, the rest through about 60 easily-cut seabed cables no thicker than garden hoses. We also depend on a handful of gas and electricity interconnectors to deal with demand peaks and supply troughs. Island states like ours are the most vulnerable to disruption of these links. A full-scale attack would leave us deaf, blind, numb, cold, broke, hungry — and defeated.
Russia’s intensifying efforts off Britain’s coast have rung alarm bells in Whitehall. Its research vessel Yantar, with formidable drones, sensors and other sub-surface capabilities, was lately seen messing about near sensitive sites in the Irish Sea. Other Russian vessels have also been busy, working for the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (known by its Russian initials of GUGI). This also operates the garmoniya system of autonomous monitoring stations on the ocean floor. It includes long-range sensors and, spooks say, the capacity to refuel drones that carry saws, claws and explosives. The greatest danger is in the depths, where monitoring mischief is hardest and repairs take the longest.
The most optimistic view is that Russia is merely scouting the seabed for future sabotage targets. But spy ships and submarines may have already planted mines there or left drones lurking near our pipes and cables to be activated remotely in the event of a crisis.
In the chilly waters of the Baltic Sea this conflict is already boiling. Russia has repeatedly attacked cables, gas pipes and power lines linking the Nordic and Baltic countries and Germany and Poland. Last month a Chinese bulk carrier, the Yi Peng 3, dragged its anchor for 100 miles along the seabed, destroying two international data cables. In October 2023 the Chinese-owned Newnew Polar Bear breached a gas pipeline and two data cables. Investigators believe both attacks were at Russia’s behest. On Christmas Day, the Eagle S, an oil tanker sailing from Russia, broke one of the two power lines linking Finland and Estonia and damaged four internet cables.
Timidity creates a new normal for hostile states to attack with impunity
These stunts have cost millions and will take months to repair. The disruption was minimal thanks to abundant back-ups. But the aim of the Russian attacks, says Lithuania’s defence minister Dovile Sakaliene, is to assess reactions, exposing delay and testing unity. That helps the Kremlin fine-tune its tactics for a looming and much bigger confrontation, she says.
The attacks on our decisionmaking have been successful. The first Chinese anchor-dragger was allowed to sail away. The second eventually left after a month-long stand-off in international waters with Danish, Swedish and German naval and coastguard ships. A Russian warship loitered nearby, firing flares to deter scrutiny. Western officials were allowed a token inspection but not to investigate.
One spine-slackening factor is America’s lame-duck administration. Another is Germany’s political crisis. Seizing ships on the high seas is legally tricky. Anything Nato does here could set a precedent for a Chinese blockade of Taiwan. But dithering and timidity create a new normal in which hostile states can attack infrastructure, institutions or individuals with impunity. The seabed is only one theatre in this new “grey zone” of unconventional warfare.
The US has nagged us about this for years, first privately, then publicly, with mixed results. The growing danger keeps defence wonks awake at night. It should worry politicians too. “It’s a huge risk, not yet fully grasped,” says Lord West of Spithead, a former naval chief. Ireland’s feeble defences make it a particularly weak spot. “If Ireland goes down, we will too,” says Tom Tugendhat, the former security minister.
For decades we thought the seabed was safe, barring accidents and carelessness. We invested little or nothing in protecting it from malevolent behaviour. Britain has hurriedly bought two ships to help our overstretched navy monitor seabed mischief, but making them fully operational has been fraught with delays and mishaps. As with so many other parts of our defence, we lack money, the skills and the people to do the job properly. It is all too little and too late.
Yet we have options. As (still, just) Europe’s biggest maritime power, Britain should be leading international discussions about how to respond, for example by targeting Russia’s 1,000-strong sanctionsbusting “shadow fleet” of tankers, which now make up about a sixth of the global seaborne oil trade. If these vessels — typically dangerously dilapidated and uninsured — are also engaged in spying and sabotage, the case for curbing their activities is overwhelming. We could also start seizing Russian central bank assets to pay for the damage.
Finland has shown how to react. It promptly boarded and seized the rogue tanker, pending prosecution for aggravated vandalism. A search also revealed that the vessel was carrying equipment used for electronic espionage. Russia is now crying “piracy” and threatening to escort its tankers with warships.
Many in the region feel that economic weakness is making the Kremlin increasingly reckless, requiring a firm, collective response. Nato will meet today to discuss the Baltic Sea attacks and is belatedly beefing up its efforts there.
The war started some time ago. But not everyone has noticed yet.
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